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The Heart and Mind at Work: The Effects of Implicit and Explicit Reasoning on 
Performance Appraisal 
Since Landy and Farr’s (1980) watershed review and evaluation of the 
performance appraisal literature, research on performance appraisal has been 
redirected toward investigation of the cognitive processes involved (Ilgen, Barnes-
Farrell, & McKellin, 1993).  Barnes-Farrell (2001) notes that there are a number of 
important cognitive processes involved in performance appraisal.  Because 
individuals cannot explicitly process every piece of information about a subordinate, 
they must employ some cognitive simplification strategies.  These simplification 
strategies are associated with implicit reasoning (Hogarth, 2001) and, according to 
Payne and Gawronski (2010), evidence is emerging that a great deal of social 
information processing is implicit.  Barnes-Farrell (2001) discusses how implicit 
reasoning can increase accuracy in performance appraisal.  Specifically, appraisers 
often face information overload; when facing information overload, implicit 
processes can be more accurate than explicit processes (Hogarth, 2005).  McMackin 
and Slovic (2000) and Wilson and Schooler (1991) explored different task conditions 
under which implicit and explicit reasoning are superior in different cognitive tasks.  
The purpose of the present study is to further investigate implicit and explicit 
reasoning in the context of performance appraisal, under conditions of low and high 
cognitive load. 
The current study investigates the merits of explicit and implicit reasoning 
processes in performance appraisal judgments.  Explicit processes are explicit in the 
sense that one is aware of the details of the process (MacDonald, 2008; Hogarth, 
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2001).  Implicit processes are implicit in the sense that one is not aware of the details 
of the process.  Explicit processes are often associated with controlled and conscious 
processes, whereas implicit processes are associated with automatic and unconscious 
processes (Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977).   
Explicit processes are associated with analysis whereas implicit processes are 
associated with intuition (Hammond, 1996, Hogarth, 2001).  Hammond’s (1996) 
cognitive continuum theory explains the relationship between analysis and intuition.  
Analysis is described as being slow, high in cognitive control, and high in conscious 
awareness, whereas intuition is described as being fast, low in cognitive control, and 
low in conscious awareness.  As the name implies, cognitive continuum theory does 
not consider a process to be completely analytical or completely intuitive.  Analysis 
and intuition are opposite ends of a continuum.  A process can be partly analytical 
and partly intuitive.  The current study examines explicit and implicit processes in 
performance appraisal judgments.  As suggested by cognitive continuum theory, a 
performance appraisal judgment may be partly explicit and partly implicit.  
Individuals making performance appraisal judgments may use a combination of 
explicit and implicit processes.  Supervisors who are making performance appraisal 
judgments may explicitly weigh specific aspects of an employee’s performance, or 
simply rely on their intuitive impression of how well the employee is performing.  
The current study compares the accuracy of these two approaches.   
The accuracy of implicit cognitive processes 
A great deal of research has investigated the merits of quick, intuitive, implicit 
judgments (e.g., Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, & Pearson, 1987; McMackin & Slovic, 
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2000; Hogarth, 2001; Sloman, 1996).  One demonstration of the accuracy of implicit 
cognitive processes was performed by Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio 
(1997).  Participants played a game in which they chose cards from different decks.  
Each card could result in a positive or negative payout.  The goal was to find the deck 
that had the most positive payouts.  Participants began showing implicit awareness 
before they were explicitly aware that the decks were positive.  The evidence for this 
implicit awareness was that participants displayed an increased galvanic skin 
response before choosing a card from the deck with negative payouts.  The skin 
conductance response indicated an increase in sweat, which was assumed to be 
associated with negative affect.  This negative affect response was interpreted as 
evidence that participants “knew” that the decks were negative.  However, when 
asked whether they knew which deck was more positive, they responded that they did 
not.  These results indicated that the participants behaved as if they knew which decks 
were advantageous even though this “knowledge” was not explicit.  This is one 
example in which an implicit cognitive process is more accurate than an explicit 
cognitive process, assuming that accuracy is defined as the speed with which one can 
uncover a pattern. 
Under certain conditions, explicitly considering specific reasons for a 
judgment can lead to inaccuracy.  Wilson and Schooler (1991) performed a 
manipulation in which individuals were asked to write out reasons for their judgments 
before making the judgments.  In the current paper this is referred to as the 
justification manipulation.  This manipulation leads individuals to take a process that 
is implicit and make the process more explicit.  Participants made judgments of the 
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quality of strawberry jams.  Some participants wrote down justifications before 
making the ratings while others did not.  Judgment accuracy was defined as matching 
the ratings given by experts published in a popular consumer magazine.  Those who 
wrote down their justifications did not match the ratings of experts as accurately as 
those who did not write down their justifications.  Accuracy of judgment was reduced 
by making reasons for the judgment explicit.   
McMackin and Slovic (2000) performed a study using the justification 
manipulation, in which one is asked to provide reasons for a judgment before making 
the judgment.  They had a group of students rate specific print advertisements on 
likeability.  Other participants were then asked to estimate how each advertisement 
scored in the survey of students.  Accuracy was defined as the extent to which 
participants’ ratings matched ratings from other students at their university.  In one 
condition the participants were told to write down the factors that were likely to 
influence students’ ratings of the ads before they provided judgments.  In a control 
condition participants were simply told to provide ratings.  Results indicated that 
participants who wrote down their reasons were less accurate than participants who 
did not write down their reasons.  This is further evidence that making a process 
explicit can decrease accuracy. 
Why would writing down reasons for a judgment make the judgment less 
accurate?  Wilson and Schooler (1991) suggest that participants in the control 
condition of their study evaluated the stimuli “fairly optimally” (p. 191).  If an 
individuals’ initial implicit reaction is accurate, asking someone to make that reaction 
explicit can only make the judgment less (or equally) accurate.  Accuracy is so high 
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that it cannot increase, it can only decrease or remain the same.  Wilson and Schooler 
(1991) suggest that justification can change an individuals’ natural reaction and “To 
the extent that their initial reaction was adaptive and functional, this change might be 
in a less optimal direction” (p. 182).  Wilson and Schooler (1991) also suggest that 
individuals often do not understand the true reasons for their attitudes.  When they 
write out their reasons, these reasons may simply represent what is accessible at the 
time, rather than reflecting true reasons for their belief.  When considering their 
reasons, these reasons may conflict with their implicit appraisal of an object, and this 
causes them to make a different rating than if they had not written out their reasons.   
The accuracy of explicit cognitive processes 
 It may seem unlikely that focusing on reasons for a judgment can decrease 
judgment accuracy.  Both research and common sense tell us that careful, explicit 
judgments have great advantages over implicit judgments (Janis & Mann, 1977).  
However, the claim being made in the current study is not that implicit judgments are 
always superior to explicit judgments.  Implicit judgments will be superior to explicit 
judgments in specific circumstances (Hogarth, 2005).  Perhaps the most important 
condition is whether a process can be specified by rules (Hammond et al, 1987; 
Hogarth, 2001).  These rules could be logical rules or mathematical formulas.  This 
may be why reasoning about physics is a common example of when intuition leads us 
astray.  Basic motion of objects is well specified by precise rules and mathematical 
formulas, so using intuition rather than analytical formulas is likely to lead to error.  
Another condition under which explicit judgments are more accurate than implicit 
judgment is when there is a limited amount of information (Hogarth, 2005).  Hogarth 
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(2005) states that under low analytical complexity, explicit reasoning is more accurate 
than implicit reasoning.   
The McMackin and Slovic study (2000) described earlier found that when 
rating the likeability of print advertisements, implicit judgments were more accurate 
than explicit judgments. However, the authors did not claim that thinking about a 
judgment always leads to errors.  The advertising task was chosen because it was 
thought to be a task that would benefit from implicit reasoning, based on criteria 
specified in cognitive continuum theory (Hammond, 1996).  In contrast, certain 
judgments may be made more accurately if explicit thought is put into them.  
McMackin and Slovic (2000) tested the hypothesis that explicit judgments are 
sometimes more accurate than implicit judgments.  They asked participants to make 
judgments about numerical quantities, such as the area of the United States.  Like the 
advertising study, participants in this sample were split into a control group and a 
justification group.  In the justification group participants wrote down their reasons 
for judgments of numerical quantities before making those judgments.  Participants 
who gave reasons for their judgments were more accurate than people who did not 
give reasons.  These results indicate that explicit reasoning can outperform implicit 
reasoning when performing tasks that favor explicit reasoning (Hammond et. al, 
1987; Hogarth, 2001).  Under some conditions, providing justification before a 
judgment can have a favorable effect on the quality of the judgment.   
Performance appraisal 
A number of performance appraisal studies have investigated processes that 
involve implicit and explicit reasoning, such as the effect of keeping a diary on 
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performance appraisal (Bernardin & Walter, 1987; DeNisi, Robbins, & Cafferty, 
1989; Varma, DeNisi & Peters, 1996).  Writing things in a diary is similar to writing 
out reasons for a judgment; it makes cognitive processes explicit.  DeNisi, Robbins 
and Cafferty (1989) performed a study in which participants either did or did not keep 
a diary.  Participants watched videotapes of carpenters performing their work, and 
then rated the quality of the work using a Likert scale.  The dependent variable in the 
study was accuracy of the participant’s overall ratings of performance.  Accuracy was 
defined as how well the participants’ ratings matched the level of performance 
displayed in the video segments.  The performances of the carpenters were 
deliberately designed to display three levels of performance: low, medium, and high 
(and testing showed that the videos did display low, medium, and high performance).  
Results indicated that participants in the diary condition were the more accurate than 
participants in the no diary condition.  Participants in the diary conditions were able 
to distinguish between high, moderate, and low performance, but participants in the 
no diary condition were not able to distinguish between these performance levels.  
The evidence from this study indicated that writing down information before making 
ratings leads to greater accuracy.   
Varma, DeNisi, and Peters (1996) studied the relationship between diary 
keeping and affect.  Participants were supervisors working in a large multi-national 
electronics firm.  Participants either did or did not keep a diary.  Affect was 
conceptualized in a similar way to likeability, with measures such as “I would like to 
spend more time with this person.”  Contrary to the researchers’ predictions, the 
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relationship between affect and ratings was lowest in the no diary condition.  The 
researchers expected the relationship to be highest in the no diary condition. 
Performance appraisal systems often require supervisors to both rate 
performance and give justification(s) for their ratings (Brutus, 2010).  For example, a 
supervisor may give an employee a rating on a 1 to 5 scale indicating the quality of 
the employee’s work, and this numerical rating may also be delivered with a narrative 
explaining the strengths and weaknesses of the employee’s performance.  When 
looking at a rating and written justification, subordinates may assume that the rating 
is based on the reasons given in writing.  They may assume that their supervisor 
carefully considered all aspects of their performance, and wrote down all of these 
reasons; then, after carefully considering all aspects of performance, the supervisor 
made the numerical rating.  However, there is another possibility.  Rather than the 
written narrative influencing the rating, it is also possible that the numerical rating 
influenced the written narrative.  Supervisors are likely to have been watching 
employees throughout the evaluation period.  Over that time, it is likely that they 
formed judgments of their employees’ performance.  When it comes time to review 
the employees’ performance, they may already know what numerical ratings they will 
assign.  Therefore, they might first write down a numerical rating, and then develop 
written justification based on their rating.  It is possible that supervisors’ numerical 
ratings conform to the written data they have provided, but it is also possible that they 
selectively present written justifications that conform to the ratings they have 
assigned.  Results from Wilson and Schooler (1991) and McMackin and Slovic 
(2000) indicate that writing down reasons before (as opposed to after) making a 
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judgment can affect the accuracy of the judgment.  It is important to understand any 
effect that order (written narrative first vs. numerical rating first) has on the 
performance appraisal process. 
Memory-based and online judgments 
Other performance appraisal studies that have investigated the 
implicit/explicit distinction have involved the relationship between memory and 
judgment (DeNisi & Peters, 1996; Sanchez & De La Torre, 1996; Woehr & Feldman, 
1993).  These studies are similar to the explicit justification studies (McMackin & 
Slovic, 2000; Wilson & Schooler, 1991) because people write down recalled 
behaviors before making ratings.  Many of these studies are based on the distinction 
between memory-based and online judgments (Hastie & Park, 1986).  Online 
judgments occur when individuals are asked to form judgments before they observe a 
person.  These judgments are made “online” in the sense that individuals are forming 
judgments while they are making their observations.  Memory-based judgments occur 
when someone is asked to make a judgment only after observing a person.  These 
judgments are memory-based because one must rely on memory when making the 
judgment.  For example, someone may listen to a conversation and then later be asked 
to make an unexpected judgment, such as an individual’s age.  Because one did not 
expect to make the judgment, one must essentially recreate the conversation based on 
memory, and then make the judgment.  The judgment will be based on whatever cues 
the individual can remember.  If one were told before listening to the conversation 
that one would be guessing an individual’s age, one would make the judgment while 
listening to the conversation, and would not need to rely on memory.  This is deemed 
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to be an online judgment.  Hastie and Park (1986) showed that when individuals 
made memory-based judgments, there was a significant correlation between the 
favorability of recalled behaviors and the favorability of judgments, because the 
judgment was based on the recalled behaviors.  When an online judgment was made, 
the correlation between the favorability of recalled behaviors and the favorability of 
judgment was not significant.   
When executing a performance appraisal study, it is important to consider 
whether participants will be making online or memory based judgments, because 
participants may make different judgments depending on whether the judgments are 
made online or are memory-based (Woehr & Feldman, 1993).  Based on the work of 
Hastie and Park (1986), Woehr and Feldman (1993) investigated the relationship 
between performance appraisal judgments and memory.  Participants rated the 
effectiveness of an economics professor delivering a lecture based on a videotape of 
performance.  The memory task involved writing out all of the behaviors that 
participants could recall from watching the videos.  A ratio was calculated between 
the number of positive behaviors recalled and the number of negative behaviors 
recalled.  This allowed for a correlation to be computed between ratings and memory: 
The positivity of the rating was compared to the positivity of the memories.  The 
order of the ratings task and memory task was manipulated.  One group made the 
rating first and then performed the memory task, and one group performed the 
memory task and then made the rating.  In the “memory task first” condition, 
participants wrote about behaviors relevant to the judgment they were about to make, 
and then made the judgment.  This is similar to the justification manipulation used in 
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the McMackin and Slovic (2000) and Wilson and Schooler (1991) studies, in which 
individuals write out reasons for a judgment before making the judgment.  In the 
“rating task first” condition of Woehr and Feldman (1993), participants first made 
judgments, and later tried to recall behaviors displayed in the videos.  Because the 
memory task came after the rating, it could not have influenced the rating.  This is 
similar to the control groups from the McMackin and Slovic (2000) and Wilson and 
Schooler (1991) studies.  In the control groups of these studies, participants did not 
write out justifications before making ratings. 
In the memory-based judgment condition of Woehr and Feldman (1993), 
participants were told to learn as much of the lecture material as possible.  In the 
online judgment condition, participants were told to focus on the professor’s 
performance.  The results from Woehr and Feldman (1993) are displayed in Table 1.  
Within the memory-based judgment condition, the order of the tasks did not affect the 
correlation between memory and rating.  In both the “rating task first” and “memory 
task first” conditions, there was a significant positive correlation between memory 
and the performance appraisal rating.  This correlation was positive because 
individuals who remembered more positive behaviors made more positive ratings.  
The memory-rating vs. rating-memory order did not affect the correlation between 
memory and rating because the same basic process was used to make the performance 
ratings, whether the memory task was performed first or the rating task was 
performed first.  Within the online judgment condition, the order of the tasks did 
affect the correlation between memory and rating.  When the memory task came 
before the rating, there was a correlation between memory and rating.  However, if 
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the memory task came after the rating, there was no correlation between memory and 
rating.  The reason that the order was important was because if the memory task came 
first, it was able to affect the judgment.   
The manipulation used in the current study is similar to the memory-rating 
order manipulation in Woehr and Feldman (1993).  In the current study individuals 
will watch video segments and rate performance of the individuals in the segments.  
In the explicit condition individuals will write out their reasons for a judgment before 
making the judgment.  This condition is similar to the condition in Woehr and 
Feldman (1993) in which individuals first tried to recall behaviors and then made 
judgments.  In the implicit condition of the current study, individuals will not write 
out reasons before making judgments.  This condition is similar to the condition in 
Woehr and Feldman (1993) in which individuals made ratings before recalling 
behaviors.  In the current study, the hypothesis is that there will be a difference 
between the implicit and explicit conditions.  Woehr and Feldman (1993) found a 
difference between the rating first and memory first conditions in their study, but only 
when an online judgment was made.  Because of the similarity between the 
conditions in the current study and the conditions in Woehr and Feldman (1993), it is 
likely that a difference will be found between the implicit and explicit conditions only 
if individuals are making online judgments.  Therefore, in the current study, 
individuals will be led to make online rather than memory based judgments.  This 
will be accomplished by telling individuals, before they begin watching the video 
segments, that they will be rating the performance of the individuals in the videos. 
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Confidence  
Under certain conditions, when individuals focus on reasons for a judgment 
before providing the judgment, the judgment decreases in accuracy (McMackin & 
Slovic, 2000; Wilson & Schooler, 1991).  One possible mechanism for this decrease 
in accuracy involves confidence.  Individuals may doubt themselves after thinking 
about their reasons for making a judgment (Hammond et. al., 1987; Hogarth, 2001, 
Tordesillas & Chaiken, 1999).  This decrease in confidence may lead them to change 
their judgment, even though the judgment may have been initially correct.  This 
decrease in confidence is especially likely because research (Hammond et. al., 1987; 
Hogarth, 2001, Tordesillas & Chaiken, 1999) has indicated that individuals often 
have more confidence in implicit reasoning than explicit reasoning.   
Tordesillas & Chaiken (1999) investigated confidence using the justification 
procedure similar to McMackin and Slovic (2000).  The manipulation had individuals 
rate the importance of multiple factors that went into their ratings.  This manipulation 
was supposed to make reasoning explicit.  The results indicated that those who rated 
multiple factors were less confident than those who did not.  This is consistent with 
the claim made by Hammond et al. (1987) that those who use an explicit method are 
less confident than those who use an implicit method. 
Preferences in performance appraisal ratings 
When rating an individuals’ performance, raters are often required to provide 
both ratings and justification for ratings.  If the order of these two processes is 
important, a related question is which order raters prefer.  A search of the 
performance appraisal literature did not yield any research addressing whether 
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individuals prefer providing ratings before justification or justification before ratings.  
However, studies that address similar questions (Kelley, 2006; Arkes, 2003) suggest 
that individuals may prefer making ratings first.   
Kelley (2006) studied the response rate of surveys using different types of 
rating scales.  Two different surveys were mailed.  Each had the same number of 
items.  One group received a survey that had a single holistic Likert rating scale next 
to each item.  The Likert scale measured the relevance of each behavior queried in the 
survey.  A second group received a scale that disaggregated the rating into frequency 
and importance items.  The frequency and importance items were placed next to one 
another on each page, so that the actual number of items did not change in the two 
conditions.  The results indicated that people who were mailed the holistic measure 
had higher response rates than people who were mailed the disaggregated measure.  
This lower response rate may have occurred because there were twice as many ratings 
to be made.  However, it is also possible that individuals simply have an aversion to 
making disaggregated ratings. 
Arkes (2003) described suggestions that he made to the National Science 
Foundation and the National Institute of Health.  One of the suggestions made to both 
agencies was to disaggregate their ratings of grant proposals.  The grants had been 
rated in a holistic manner, with each grant receiving a single rating of quality.  Arkes 
suggested that they rate each proposal on four separate criteria, and then average the 
ratings.  He noted that research supported the idea that the averaged ratings would be 
more valid and reliable than the holistic ratings.  However, the disaggregation was not 
accepted by either organization.  The officials at the organizations stated that they 
   
 
19 
preferred to evaluate with their “gut.”  They preferred to make a holistic, single 
rating, rather than carefully breaking down their judgment into various parts.  The 
officials also stated that they did not want to adhere to specific criteria.  These data 
indicate that people prefer to make holistic, intuitive evaluations, rather than ratings 
based on a number of explicit factors.   
Hypotheses 
The goal of this study is to investigate explicit and implicit performance 
appraisal judgments.  Researchers have suggested that explicit processes are more 
accurate than implicit processes when a judgment can be decomposed and rules can 
be easily discovered (see Hogarth, 2005).  A judgment that is based on specific 
criteria may be more formulaic than a judgment of overall performance.  Therefore 
explicit judgments may be more accurate than implicit judgments when rating a 
specific behavior.   
Hypothesis 1: 
When rating a specific aspect of performance, participants will be more accurate 
when making explicit judgments than implicit judgments. When rating overall 
performance, participants will be more accurate when making implicit judgments 
than explicit judgments. 
Researchers have also suggested that implicit processes, relative to explicit 
processes, increase in accuracy as information increases (Hogarth, 2005). 
Hypothesis 2: 
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Under low cognitive load, participants will be more accurate when making explicit 
judgments than implicit judgments. Under high cognitive load, participants will be 
more accurate when making implicit judgments than explicit judgments.   
 Tordesillas & Chaiken (1999) and Hammond et. al. (1987) have indicated that 
individuals have more confidence in their implicit judgments than their explicit 
judgments. 
Hypothesis 3: 
Participants in the implicit condition will be more confident in their ratings than 
participants in the explicit condition. 
 Based on the Arkes (2003) and Masicampo and Baumeister (2008), 
individuals should prefer to make simple, holistic judgments over complex, analytical 
judgments.   
Hypothesis 4: 
When choosing between making a rating first or providing reasons for the rating first, 
participants will prefer to provide the rating first. 
Method 
Overview 
 Participants watched video segments of a male or female food server working 
at a restaurant.  In the high cognitive load condition they watched 18 video segments, 
and in the low cognitive load condition they watched 6 segments.  Participants were 
then asked to make ratings of the performance of the food server.  In the explicit 
condition, participants were first asked to type out their reasons for making the rating 
before making the rating.  In the implicit condition, participants were not asked to 
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type out their reasons.  In the overall condition, participants rated the overall 
performance of the server, and in the specific condition, participants rated the specific 
behaviors of memory and cooperation.  Participants then answered questions to assess 
how well they remembered behaviors displayed in the video segments. 
Participants 
Data were collected from 316 undergraduate students enrolled in introductory 
psychology classes.  Participants received course credit for their participation.  The 
sample included 203 women and 113 men.  A total of 74 participants had worked as 
food server and 242 had not.   
Design 
This experiment was a 2 x 2 x 2 completely crossed between-subjects design.  
Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions.  The factors were 
justification type (explicit, implicit), cognitive load (low, high) and rating type 
(overall, specific).   
Materials 
All data in the study were collected with Media Lab version 2006.  Media Lab 
is a software tool designed to present stimuli and measure responses in behavioral 
science studies.  The materials used in this study were a series of video segments.  
They presented a male or female server working at a restaurant.  A sample script is 
displayed in Appendix A.  The video segments were originally developed by Barnes-
Farrell (1984).  Lewis (2006) recreated these tapes in order to make them appear 
more contemporary.  Half of the videos portrayed a female food server named Karen, 
and half portrayed a male food server named Mike.  There are two versions of each 
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video, one with Mike and one with Karen.  Except for the different food servers, the 
two versions of each video are the same. 
In the high cognitive load condition there were 12 target video segments and 
6 distracter video segments.  In the low cognitive load condition there were 4 target 
video segments and 2 distracter video segments.  Participants in the high load 
condition rated 12 target video segments in the first part of the study, and 6 distracter 
segments at the end of the study.  Participants in the low load condition rated 4 target 
video segments in the first part of the study, and 2 distracter segments at the end of 
the study.  Table 2 and Table 3 display the behaviors featured in the videos segments: 
memory, dinner bill activities, maintaining performance levels, and cooperation.  The 
video segments were played one after another with no pauses between segments.  For 
half of the participants the target video segments included the male server and 
distracter segments included the female server.  For the other half of participants 
target video segments included the female server and distracter segments included the 
male server.  The segments were arranged randomly for each participant. 
Expert scores 
 As suggested by Murphy, Garcia, Kerkar, Martin, and Balzer (1982) and 
Borman (1978), accuracy of performance appraisal ratings was defined as the 
difference between participants’ ratings and “expert scores.”  The procedure for 
obtaining expert scores was based on the method used by Borman (1978).  Four (two 
men and two women) Ph.D. candidates in Industrial and Organizational Psychology 
each rated 18 videos.  All of these subject matter experts had worked as food servers.  
The experts watched the videos on computer monitors.  Each video was rated 
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individually, with one rating for each video.  Because the videos of the male and 
female server were identical, experts rated only the videos of the female.  Experts 
were informed of potential rating errors, including halo, leniency, and contrast 
effects.  They were each given a piece of paper that explained the criteria for each of 
the six performance dimensions (see Appendix B).  
The intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC) was used as a measure of 
reliability for the expert ratings. According to LeBreton and Senter (2008), one 
specific type of ICC, the ICC(A, K), is appropriate when ascertaining the extent to 
which a mean rating assigned by multiple judges is reliable.  In the current study we 
are interested in the reliability of the mean rating provided by the expert judges.  The 
value of the ICC(18, 4) was .89.  This measure is greater than .80, indicating high 
reliability (LeBreton & Senter, 2008). 
Procedure 
An overview of the procedure is presented in Table 4.  The study was 
conducted in a computer laboratory.  Participants were run in groups ranging from 9 
to 18.  When participants arrived at the study an experiment information sheet was 
provided.  Participants were informed that participation was voluntary and that they 
may withdraw at any time.  The script in Appendix C was read aloud to the group of 
participants.  Participants were informed that they would be asked to rate the 
performance of restaurant servers after watching video segments.   
After viewing the video segments, participants made ratings of performance 
on a 7-point Likert scale.  Participants rated the server featured in the target video 
segments.  Table 5 displays the instructions given as a function of condition (see also 
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Appendix D).  In the explicit condition, participants first typed out their reasons for 
making ratings before making the performance ratings, whereas in the implicit 
condition they did not type out ratings.  In the overall condition, participants rated 
overall performance, whereas in the specific condition, they rated the server’s 
cooperation and memory performance.  After each performance rating, participants 
were asked to rate how confident they were about their performance rating on a 7-
point Likert scale, ranging from 1 (not at all confident) to 7 (completely confident).   
Participants then performed the memory recognition task (Kinicki, Hom, 
Trost, & Wade, 1995; Lewis, 2006; Lord, 1985).  Participants were asked to respond 
“yes” or “no” to 12 questions asking whether or not certain behaviors occurred.  The 
memory recognition questions are displayed in Tables 2 and 3, and a sample is 
provided in Appendix E.  Half of the correct answers were “yes” and half were “no.”  
The questions in the high load and low load conditions were different because the 
videos in the two conditions were different.   
After performing the memory recognition task, participants performed the 
final rating (see Appendix F).  The purpose of the final performance rating was to 
determine whether participants preferred to give ratings first or to give reasons for 
ratings first.  Participants were given one of two sets of instructions to counterbalance 
the order in which the tasks were mentioned.  The instructions were: “We want you to 
give both performance ratings and reasons for the ratings that you give.  Please click 
one of the buttons below” or “We want you to give both reasons for the ratings that 
you give and performance ratings.  Please click one of the buttons below.”  The 
screen displayed two buttons that displayed the text “Rating” and “Reasons For 
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Rating” horizontally.  The order was counterbalanced so that in half the cases the 
“Rating” button was on the left and in half the cases it was on the right. 
Participants then filled out the decision making inventory (DMI) (Nygren & 
White, 2002).  The DMI was included as an exploratory measure.  The DMI measures 
the extent to which individuals prefer to use analytical and intuitive reasoning.   
Finally, participants were asked to provide their gender and whether they ever worked 
as a food server. 
Results 
Dependent measure computation  
Table 6 displays an overview of computation of the dependent measures.  The 
primary dependent measure was accuracy of performance rating.  Accuracy was 
computed by taking the ratings of participants and subtracting them from the ratings 
of experts and then taking the absolute value of those scores (as did Borman, 1978, 
and McMakin & Slovic, 2000).  These accuracy scores represent deviation from the 
expert scores.  Because the scores represent deviation from the expert ratings, higher 
scores represent less accuracy.   
Recognition accuracy was computed using the Ad′ measure, a signal detection 
statistic (Stanislaw & Todorov, 1999).  Ad′ represents participants’ ability to 
distinguish correct and incorrect answers.  As suggested by Stanislaw and Todorov 
(1999, p. 144), hit rate and false alarm rates of 0.0 were replaced with 0.5/n and hit 
rate and false alarm rates of 1.0 were replaced with (n - .05)/n. 
Table 7 displays the mean performance ratings and true (expert) scores for 
each condition.  The performance ratings are participants’ ratings of the target videos.  
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The expert scores displayed in the table are the average of the expert ratings of the 
target videos.  To ensure that expert scores matched the expected level of 
performance, the average expert score was also computed for low, medium and high 
performance.  The average expert scores were 1.89 for low performance, 4.23 for 
medium performance, and 7.00 for high performance.   
Effects of the justification manipulation on ratings  
Table 8 displays mean performance ratings as a function of justification type.  
To test for the effect of justification for each rating, t-tests were computed separately 
for the memory, cooperation, and overall ratings.  For the memory rating, there was a 
significant effect for justification, t(159) = 2.33, p < .05.  Participants in the explicit 
condition gave higher ratings than participants in the implicit condition.  For the 
cooperation rating, there was no significant effect for justification, t(159) = 2.33, p > 
.05, and for the overall rating, there was no significant effect for justification, t(153) = 
1.16, p > .05.  Only one of the three tests was significant, and the mean effect size for 
the three mean differences was 0.29.  Overall, the justification factor had small effects 
on performance rating values. 
Another way to test the effect of justification is to count the number of words 
typed.  If typing words reflects explicit reasoning, then participants who typed more 
words may have been using more explicit reasoning than participants who typed 
fewer words.  The correlations between number of words and memory (r(158) = -
.10), cooperation (r(158) = .07), and overall (r(158) = .09) ratings were not 
significant, all ps > .05.  The number of words that participants wrote did not affect 
the performance ratings. 
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Rating accuracy 
 Table 9 displays scores for rating accuracy and recognition accuracy.  Rating 
accuracy scores represent a combination of overall, memory, and cooperation 
accuracy ratings (see Table 6 for exact computational details).  An ANOVA was 
performed on rating accuracy.  The independent variables for the ANOVA included 
the three manipulated factors (justification, cognitive load, and rating type) and all 
two-way interactions between these factors.  Participant sex, sex of the server 
featured in the videos (server sex), and experience as a server were included as 
control variables.  The results of the ANOVA are displayed in Table 10.  The 
ANOVA revealed a main effect for participant sex, F(1, 306) = 10.71, p < .05.  
Women (M = 1.02, SD = 0.67) were significantly more accurate than men (M = 1.22, 
SD = 0.76).  There was also a main effect for cognitive load, F(1, 306) = 11.51, p < 
.05, with high load participants (M = 0.97, SD = 0.70) being more accurate than low 
load participants (M = 1.23, SD = 0.69).  This main effect is difficult to interpret 
because the videos in the two conditions were different, therefore the level of 
difficulty may have been different in the two conditions.  There was a significant 
interaction between cognitive load and rating type, F(1, 306) = 14.96, p < .05 (see 
mean values in Table 11).  T-tests revealed that in the low cognitive load condition, 
participants rating overall performance were more accurate than those rating specific 
performance, t(150) = 3.14, p < .01.  In the high cognitive load condition, there was 
no difference between the overall and specific ratings, t(162) = 1.59, p > .05, although 
there was a trend toward specific ratings being more accurate than overall ratings.   
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Hypothesis 1 stated that there would be an interaction between the 
justification manipulation and the rating type manipulation.  Contrary to Hypothesis 
1, the interaction between justification and rating type was not significant, F(1, 306) = 
0.74, p > .05.  This result indicated that the effect of the justification manipulation on 
rating accuracy did not differ in the specific and overall conditions.  Hypothesis 2 
stated that there would be an interaction between justification and cognitive load on 
rating accuracy.  Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the interaction between justification and 
cognitive load was not significant, F(1, 306) = 0.56, p > .05.  This result indicated 
that the effect of the justification manipulation on rating accuracy did not differ in the 
high and low cognitive load conditions.  The main effect for justification was also not 
significant, F(1, 306) = 1.45, p > .05.  The correlation between number of words 
typed in the explicit condition and rating accuracy was not significant, r(158) = .08, p 
> .05.  
Recognition accuracy 
  Table 9 displays scores for recognition accuracy.  An ANOVA was performed 
on recognition accuracy.  The independent variables for the ANOVA included the 
three manipulated factors (justification, cognitive load, and rating type) and all two-
way interactions between these factors.  Participant sex, sex of the server featured in 
the videos (server sex), and experience as a server were included as control variables.  
The results of the ANOVA are displayed in Table 12.  There were main effects for 
both participant sex, F(1, 306) = 4.84, p < .05, and server sex, F(1, 306) = 7.70, p < 
.05 (see Table 13).  The main effect for participant sex is further evidence that women 
were more accurate in the current study.  The interaction term between participant sex 
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and server sex was added to the ANOVA, but was not significant, F(1, 305) = 2.27, p 
> .05.  There was a main effect for cognitive load, F(1, 306) = 96.57, p < .05, with 
low load participants (M = .81, SD = 0.12) being more accurate than high load 
participants (M = .66, SD = 0.14).   
Hypothesis 2 stated that there would be an interaction between the 
justification factor and the cognitive load factor.  Contrary to Hypothesis 2, the 
interaction between justification and cognitive load was not significant, F(1, 306) = 
0.04, p > .05.  This result indicated that the effect of the justification manipulation on 
recognition did not differ in the high and low cognitive load conditions.  The main 
effect for justification was also not significant, F(1, 306) = 0.04, p > .05.  The 
correlation between number of words typed in the explicit condition and recognition 
accuracy was not significant, r(158) = .01, p > .05.   
Confidence 
The mean confidence ratings are displayed in Table 14.  The two confidence 
values in the specific condition (confidence in memory ratings and confidence in 
cooperation ratings) were combined using the arithmetic mean.  An ANOVA was 
performed on the averaged confidence values (see Table 15).  The independent 
variables for the ANOVA included the three manipulated factors (justification, 
cognitive load, and rating type) and all two-way interactions between these factors.  
Participant sex, sex of the server featured in the videos (server sex), and experience as 
a server were included as control variables.  Hypothesis 3 claimed that participants in 
the implicit condition would be more confident in their ratings than participants in the 
explicit condition.  The main effect for justification was not significant, F(1, 306) = 
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1.14, p > .05. These results do not confirm Hypothesis 3.  There was a significant 
main effect for rating type, F(1, 306) = 5.63, p < .05.  Participants in the specific 
condition (M = 6.00, SD = 0.78) were more confident than participants in the overall 
condition (M = 5.75, SD = 1.02).   
Final rating 
Hypothesis 5 claims that when faced with a choice of making a rating first or 
providing reasons for a rating first, participants will prefer to provide the rating first.  
A chi square test, χ2(1) = 71.2, p < .05, revealed that more participants chose to 
provide the rating first (74%) than chose to provide reasons first (26%).  Even in the 
explicit condition, in which participants had been writing their reasons first 
throughout the experiment, participants chose to provide their rating first 64% of the 
time, which is significantly greater than those who chose to provide reasons first 
(36%), χ2(1) = 17.1, p < .05.   
When clicking buttons on the screen during the final rating, participants chose 
the button on the left 72% of the time, which is significantly greater than those who 
chose the button on the right (28%), χ2(1) = 58.5, p < .05.  When the “rating” button 
was on the left, participants chose that button 97% of the time, which is significantly 
greater than those who chose the button on the right (3%), χ2(1) = 133.6, p < .05.  As 
a whole, these results are overwhelming evidence that individuals generally tend to 
choose a button on the left over a button on the right, and that people choose to 
provide a rating before providing reasons for the rating. 
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Decision Making Inventory 
There were no significant correlations between the DMI and any performance 
or accuracy ratings (all ps > .05).   
Discussion 
 The primary hypotheses in the current study were not supported.  Participants 
who wrote out reasons before making judgments were not more accurate or confident 
than participants who did not write out reasons.  There were no differences between 
those who did and did not write out reasons on performance rating accuracy, memory 
recognition accuracy, and confidence in performance ratings.  Overall, the effect of 
writing out reasons was weak.   
The effect of the justification manipulation was not only small when making 
performance ratings, but also when attempting to recall behaviors.  The difference on 
the memory recognition task between those who did and did not type out reasons was 
nearly zero.  One may have suspected that, at the very least, typing out reasons for a 
judgment would have primed participants’ memory for the incidents in the video 
segments, and recognition accuracy would be higher than those who did not type out 
ratings.  This did not occur, and is evidence of the weak effects of typing out reasons 
for a judgment.  Although prior research has shown that individuals have more 
confidence in implicit reasoning than explicit reasoning (Hammond et. al., 1987; 
Hogarth, 2001, Tordesillas & Chaiken, 1999), in the current study there were no 
differences in confidence between the explicit and implicit conditions.  This result is 
further evidence that writing out reasons has a weak effect on performance appraisal 
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judgments.  It is quite surprising that carefully reflecting on a judgment has such 
minor effects on judgment, memory recognition, and confidence. 
There are several possible explanations for why the effect of the justification 
manipulation was weak.  Whenever a manipulation does not result in a difference 
between conditions, a natural question to ask is whether the manipulation was strong 
enough to elicit an effect.  The manipulation used in the current study was very 
strong.  It is difficult to imagine a more powerful way of making something explicit 
than having participants type out their reasons for making a particular rating.  
Compared to asking participants to think about their reasons and/or to speak their 
reasons out loud, typing reasons requires them to put their reasoning onto the screen, 
so they can actually see their reasons clearly.  A more likely explanation for the small 
differences between the explicit and implicit condition involves when judgments were 
made.  Participants were told twice, for emphasis, that they would be watching videos 
and rating performance of restaurant servers.  Based on Hastie and Park (1986), this 
should have led them to make “online” judgments.   These are judgments that are 
made while participants are watching the video segments.  When participants were 
then asked to type out reasons for their judgments, the judgments had already been 
made implicitly.  In this sense, they are not really writing out the reasons for their 
judgments before the judgments are made, because the judgments had already been 
made.  If this is the case, then typing out reasons may not be helpful or harmful 
because the judgments have already been made, and it is too late for the additional 
reasoning to change the judgments. 
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However, there are reasons to believe that some of the judgments made in the 
current study were memory based, rather than online, judgments.  Memory based 
judgments are unexpected, which forces individuals to rely on memory to make a 
judgment (Hastie and Park, 1986).  In the specific condition, participants did not 
know that they would be asked to make ratings specifically about the server’s 
cooperation and memory.  When they were asked to make ratings of cooperation and 
memory, they had to rely on memory to make the judgments.  Because there were no 
significant differences between the explicit and implicit conditions for the specific 
ratings, it is less likely that the explanation for these small differences is that 
participants made an online judgment.  Woehr and Feldman (1993) found that when 
individuals made memory based judgments, it did not matter whether they recalled 
behaviors first or made ratings first, just as in the current study it did not matter 
whether participants wrote out reasons before making ratings.  If participants in the 
current study made memory based judgments, then when participants were asked to 
make a performance appraisal rating, they would have consciously considered 
reasons why they should give a particular rating, even if they were not asked to type 
out their judgments.  If this is the case, then participants in the explicit and implicit 
conditions were using similar cognitive processes when making ratings.  In both 
conditions, participants explicitly thought about reasons for making ratings.  If 
participants used similar processes in both conditions, then they should have had 
similar performance ratings, confidence ratings, and memory recognition, as was 
found in the current study. 
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Based upon criteria specified in cognitive continuum theory (Hammond, 
1996), McMackin and Slovic (2000) assumed that when individuals performed tasks 
that induce implicit or explicit reasoning, individuals would be more accurate if they 
utilized a matching mode of cognition.  McMackin and Slovic (2000) assumed that 
rating advertisements would induce implicit reasoning, and they found that 
individuals were indeed more accurate when using implicit reasoning rather than 
explicit reasoning.  On the other hand, estimating numerical quantities (e.g., area of 
the U.S. in square miles) should have induced explicit reasoning.  Results confirmed 
their prediction; individuals were more accurate when using explicit reasoning than 
they were if they used implicit reasoning.  Results of the present study do not support 
those of McMakin and Slovic (2000).  Perhaps it is not always true that tasks 
inducing implicit reasoning are performed most accurately when using implicit 
reasoning.  For example, although tasks with larger number of attributes (greater than 
5) are expected to induce implicit reasoning (Hammond et al, 1987), it is questionable 
that such tasks will be more accurate when using implicit reasoning than when using 
explicit reasoning if the compound nature (pattern) of the stimulus attributes does not 
induce reappraisal.  In the current study it is possible that although the performance 
appraisal task induced implicit reasoning, it was not more accurate when implicit 
reasoning was used. 
Wilson and Schooler (1991) suggest another possible reason for the weak 
effect of the justification manipulation.  They state that individuals are often unaware 
of why they have certain beliefs.  Therefore, when individuals think about the reasons 
for the beliefs, the reasons they consider may not be the actual reasons.  Because 
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these reasons are different than their actual reasons, beliefs are changed to reflect the 
written reasons.  If this suggestion is correct, then the weakness of the justification 
manipulation in the current study may have occurred because people were aware of 
the reasons for their beliefs.  The videos contained clear examples of negative and 
positive behaviors, such as showing up late for work, bringing people the wrong 
orders, remembering everyone’s orders, and cooperating with coworkers.  Focusing 
on reasons did not change individuals’ ratings because the true reasons for their 
ratings matched their written reasons.  Wilson and Schooler (1991) also state that if 
the reasons that individuals consider are the same valence as the actual reasons for the 
belief, focusing on reasons will not change a belief.  In the current study, if 
individuals formed a positive (or negative) attitude toward the server, and then wrote 
out positive (or negative) reasons, writing out the reasons would not change the initial 
attitude/opinion.   
Wilson, Kraft, and Dunn (1989) found that when individuals were 
knowledgeable about an attitude object, there was no attitude change after thinking 
about the attitude object.  Participants in the current study should have been 
knowledgeable of the job of food server.  They are likely to have eaten at restaurants 
numerous times throughout their lives, and 31% of them had worked as food servers.  
This familiarity with the subject matter may explain the lack of differences between 
the explicit and implicit groups.  If an unfamiliar job were used instead, maybe there 
would be differences between the explicit and implicit conditions. 
Results from the current study were not consistent with those of earlier studies 
investigating explicit processes in performance appraisal (DeNisi et al., 1989; Varma 
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et al., 1996).  DeNisi et al. (1989) found that keeping a diary while watching videos 
of carpenters performing their work led to more accurate appraisal of their 
performance.  Participants in the DeNisi et al. (1989) study were told to write down 
the tasks performed and how well they were performed while watching the 
performances.  Therefore, they were taking notes while watching the videos of 
performance.  In the current study participants wrote down reasons after watching the 
videos of performance.  This lack of convergence between the current study and 
DeNisi et al. (1989) may be due to the fact that in the DeNisi study, individuals could 
use their diaries to organize information in a meaningful way as they were watching 
the video segments.  In the current study, participants’ written accounts were based 
on memory, which is fallible. 
Gender differences 
Results indicated that women were more accurate than men on the memory 
and rating tasks.  There are several possible explanations for this effect.  It is possible 
that women are simply more accurate in social judgment.  Women are more accurate 
in decoding non-verbal emotions (Hall, Carter, & Horgan, 2000).  Carter and Hall 
(2008) found the women were more accurate in detecting covariation between group 
membership and behaviors exhibited by group members, a sign of accurate social 
perception.  Another possibility is that women put more effort into the study.  Hyde 
(2001) reviewed seven studies investigating gender differences in conscientiousness, 
and indicated that women may be slightly higher in conscientiousness.  Four studies 
indicated women were higher in conscientiousness, two studies indicated that men 
were higher, and one study found no difference.   
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Confidence 
Prior research has indicated that individuals have more confidence in implicit 
reasoning than explicit reasoning (Hammond et. al., 1987; Hogarth, 2001, Tordesillas 
& Chaiken, 1999).  In the current study there was no difference in confidence 
between participants in the explicit and implicit conditions.  This suggests that 
participants in the explicit and implicit conditions may have been using similar 
cognitive processing.   
Results from the current study indicated that participants who made specific 
ratings were more confident in their ratings than those who made overall ratings.  
Participants in the specific condition may have been more confident because the 
precise, detailed directions that were provided in the specific condition may have led 
participants to believe that they knew what was required of them. 
Final rating 
The most robust findings in the current study involve the final rating.  
Participants chose to perform the rating task before providing reasons 74% of the 
time.  Perhaps participants chose to make the rating first because they prefer to make 
holistic, simple ratings rather than having to first think in detail about the rating 
(Arkes, 2003; Kelley, 2006; Masicampo & Baumeister, 2008). This preference has a 
number of possible implications.  Individuals may prefer to make holistic ratings in 
many situations. 
Participants chose the button on the left 72% of the time.  This may not be 
surprising given that many things in western culture are ordered from left to right.  
Santiago, Lupiáñez, Pérez, and Funes, (2007) list things that are ordered from left to 
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right in Western cultures.  These include text, horizontal graphs of time, comic strips, 
and book pages.  Chokron and Agostini (2000) compared the esthetic preferences of 
French and Israeli participants.  French participants read from left to right, but Israeli 
participants read from right to left.  Results indicated that left to right readers 
preferred pictures facing the right, and right to left readers preferred pictures facing 
the left.  When faced with two buttons on a screen, it appears that the left button is 
usually the first one that is examined.  The current study indicates that the default, or 
most common, option should be associated with the button on the left.   
Conclusion 
 Based on Wilson and Schooler (1991) and McMackin and Slovic (2000), there 
should have been differences between the explicit and implicit conditions in the 
current study.  However, these differences did not emerge.  The task used in the 
current study was a performance appraisal rating.  This task was different from the 
tasks used by Wilson and Schooler (1991) and McMackin and Slovic (2000).  Further 
research is needed to determine what characteristics of the current task led to the 
discrepancy between the current results and the results found in previous research. 
Participants either provided justification before making a performance 
appraisal rating, or simply made the rating.  This manipulation was meant to represent 
real world performance appraisal, in which supervisors provide both a rating and 
justification for their rating.  The results provided evidence that the order of tasks, 
providing justification first or making ratings first, did not affect performance 
appraisal ratings strongly.  As a practical matter, this may be comforting information, 
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given that there does not appear to be a common industry standard recommending a 
particular sequence of ratings and justifications. 
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Table 1 
        
Correlations between memory positivity and rating positivity 
  
   
 Memory First   Rating First    
Judgment type      
   
Online judgment 0.46*   0.10     
Memory-based judgment 0.49*    0.40*    
       
Note. From Woehr and Feldman (1993).  A * indicates a significant correlation, p < .05. 
The correlations in the online judgment condition are significantly different from one another. 
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Table 2    
    
Memory recognition questions in the high cognitive load condition 
  
    
Performance 
dimension 
Performance 
level Memory question 
Did the 
behavior 
occur? 
    
Memory    
 Low 
Karen presented the wrong order to a man and 
woman and did not apologize for her mistake. No 
 Low 
Two men were sitting at a table and Karen gave one 
man the other man's French fries. Yes 
 Medium 
Four men ordered four drinks and Karen asked each 
person who had which drink and the last drink served 
was a beer. Yes 
    
Dinner bill 
activities 
   
 Low 
Four men were looking at the bill and one of them 
stated that the bill was wrong because he had not 
ordered dessert. Yes 
 Medium 
Karen brought separate checks to each of three 
women and asked the first two what they had eaten 
and then handed the last check to the last woman 
without asking her what she had eaten. Yes 
 Medium 
A coworker noticed that Karen made one mistake on 
the bill but said that she is always very accurate. No 
    
Maintaining 
performance 
levels 
   
 Low 
Karen called a coworker by her correct name at first 
but later called her by the wrong name. Yes 
 Medium 
A coworker stated that Karen was sweating because 
she couldn't handle the pressure. No 
 Medium 
Two women stated that Karen was frustrated and 
when she came by she apologized and stated that 
she was just a little busy that night. No 
    
Cooperation    
    
 Medium 
Karen offered to help a coworker by telling her to put 
the full glasses in the middle of the tray. No 
 Medium 
A coworker asked Karen to help her and Karen moved 
some chairs and a table for her. No 
  High 
After a male coworker said that there were business 
men drinking like fish, Karen volunteered to clean his 
table. Yes 
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Table 3    
    
Memory recognition questions in the low cognitive load condition 
  
    
Performance 
dimension 
Performance 
level Memory question 
Did the 
behavior 
occur? 
    
Memory    
 Low 
Karen presented the wrong order to a man and 
woman and did not apologize for her mistake. No 
 Low 
Karen brought the wrong food and the man said that 
he ordered the angus steak. No 
 Low 
Karen brought the wrong food and when she was 
notified of the mistake she said she would go fix it for 
them. Yes 
    
Dinner bill 
activities    
 Medium 
A coworker noticed that Karen made one mistake on 
the bill but said that she is always very accurate. No 
 Medium Karen accidentally typed in a discount for carrot cake. Yes 
 Medium 
After a coworker told Karen she made an error, Karen 
said that she did and thanked the coworker. Yes 
    
Maintaining 
performance 
levels 
   
 Low 
Karen called a coworker by her correct name at first 
but later called her by the wrong name. Yes 
 Low Karen accidentally grabbed tea instead of coffee. No 
 Low 
Karen accidentally called a woman Laurie by the 
name Linda. No 
    
Cooperation    
 High 
After a male coworker said that there were business 
men drinking like fish, Karen volunteered to clean his 
table. Yes 
 High 
Karen said that she would clean off his table because 
she only has a few tables to watch. No 
 High 
The man said he had a table of nine and that they 
were drinking like fish. Yes 
 
 
   
 
50 
Table 4 
Procedure 
1. Watch 18 videos (high cognitive load condition) or watch 6 videos (low cognitive load condition) 
2. Type reasons for performance rating (explicit condition) or do not type reasons (implicit 
condition) 
3. Rate overall performance (overall condition) or rate cooperation and memory (implicit condition)1 
4. Rate confidence in the performance rating 
5. Answer memory recognition questions 
6. Choose order for final rating: Rate performance then type reasons for the rating or type reasons 
for the rating then rate performance 
7. Make final performance rating 
8. Fill out decision making Inventory 
Note.  1The memory and cooperation ratings are counterbalanced so that for half of the participants 
memory is rated first and for half cooperation is rated first. 
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Table 5    
Instructions as a function of condition 
      
  
Explicit overall 
instructions 
Explicit specific 
instructions 
Implicit overall 
instructions 
Implicit specific 
instructions 
Screen 1 
Overall 
Instructions + 
Explicit 
Instructions 
Memory Instructions 
+ Explicit 
Instructions 
Overall 
Instructions + 
"Please give a 
rating of Karen's 
overall 
performance." 
Memory Instructions 
+ "Please give a 
rating of the Karen's 
performance on 
memory."  
Screen 2 
"Please give a 
rating of Karen's 
overall 
performance." 
"Please give a 
rating of the Karen's 
performance on 
memory."  
 
Cooperation 
Instructions + 
"Please give a rating 
of Karen's 
performance on 
cooperation." 
Screen 3 
 
Cooperation 
Instructions + 
Explicit Instructions 
  
Screen 4 
  
"Please give a 
rating of Karen's 
performance on 
cooperation." 
    
Note. 
 
  
  
Explicit 
Instructions: 
On the next screen you will be asked to give a rating of Karen’s (Mike’s) 
performance.  Before making your rating, we want you to think analytically about the 
reasons for your rating.  Put your emotions aside and type, in the space below, the 
reasons you think are important in providing your rating.   
Overall 
Instructions: 
We are interested in Karen's (Mike’s) overall performance.  How well did Karen 
perform all of her duties? 
Memory 
Instructions: 
We are interested in Karen's (Mike’s) performance with respect to memory.  How 
well did Karen remember orders, bring the correct orders to the guests, and 
remember the correct beverages and side orders?   
Cooperation 
Instructions: 
We are interested in Karen's (Mike’s) performance with respect to cooperation.  How 
well did Karen accept guidance from supervisors and coworkers, and cooperate with 
and help other servers, supervisors, and wait staff?   
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Table 6   
Dependent measures summary 
  
Measure Description Formula 
Overall rating 
accuracy 
Subtract the participant's overall rating from 
the mean overall expert rating.  Take the 
absolute value.   
abs(participant's overall rating - 
mean expert overall rating )  
Memory rating 
accuracy 
Subtract the participant's memory rating 
from the mean memory expert rating.  Take 
the absolute value.   
abs(participant's cooperation 
rating - mean expert cooperation 
rating)  
Cooperation 
rating accuracy 
Subtract the participant's cooperation rating 
from the mean cooperation expert rating.  
Take the absolute value.  .   
abs(participant's memory rating - 
mean expert memory rating)  
Specific rating 
accuracy 
Take the mean of the cooperation accuracy 
rating and the recognition accuracy rating.  
mean(accuracy of memory rating, 
accuracy of overall rating) 
Rating accuracy 
In the overall condition, rating accuracy is 
equal to the overall rating accuracy.  In the 
specific condition, rating accuracy is equal 
to the specific rating accuracy (the average 
of the cooperation and memory rating 
accuracy). 
If in overall condition: overall 
rating accuracy. If in specific 
condition: specific rating accuracy 
Recognition 
accuracy 
Ability to distinguish signal from noise.  
Approximately equal to the percentage of 
memory questions answered correctly. 
NORMDIST((NORMSINV(Hit 
rate)  - NORMSINV(False alarm 
rate))/SQRT(2)) 
Note. abs = absolute value. 
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Mean performance appraisal rating as a function of condition  
        
  
Low Load 
 
High Load 
Rating Justification N Mean SD True 
Score 
  N Mean SD True 
Score 
Cooperation Implicit 39 5.64 1.14 7.00   42 6.02 0.98 6.00 
  Explicit 39 5.33 1.22 7.00   41 5.78 1.17 6.00 
Memory Implicit 39 2.26 0.97 1.25   42 2.67 1.30 3.08 
  Explicit 39 2.67 0.90 1.25   41 3.10 1.26 3.08 
Overall Implicit 33 3.36 1.27 3.63   44 4.32 1.27 3.90 
  Explicit 41 3.61 1.20 3.63   37 4.76 1.06 3.90 
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Table 8      
Mean Performance Ratings 
      
Rating Judgment N Mean SD Mean Difference 
(Implicit vs. Explicit) 
Cooperation Implicit 81 5.84 1.07 0.28  
  Explicit 80 5.56 1.21  
Memory Implicit 81 2.47 1.16 0.42* 
  Explicit 80 2.89 1.11  
Overall Implicit 77 3.91 1.35 -0.24  
  Explicit 78 4.15 1.27   
Note. * p < .05 
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Table 9             
Mean rating accuracy and recognition accuracy scores 
            
  
Low Load 
 
High Load 
Rating Justif-
ication 
N Rating    
Accuracy 
SD Recog-
nition 
Accuracy 
SD  N Rating 
Accuracy 
SD Recog-
nition 
Accuracy 
SD 
Specific Implicit 39 1.23 0.64 0.82 0.13  42 0.92 0.53 0.66 0.15 
  Explicit 39 1.57 0.74 0.82 0.12  41 0.85 0.56 0.68 0.13 
Overall Implicit 33 1.07 0.71 0.80 0.15  44 1.01 0.86 0.66 0.15 
  Explicit 41 1.04 0.58 0.81 0.10   37 1.11 0.79 0.65 0.15 
             
Note. Rating accuracy represents deviation from the expert score: Higher scores indicate less 
accuracy.  Recognition accuracy is based on the Ad′ statistic: Higher scores indicate greater 
accuracy. 
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Table 10    
Analysis of Variance for Performance Rating Accuracy 
  
Source df F p 
Experience as a server 1 0.00 0.96   
Server Sex 1 0.00 0.95  
Participant Sex 1 10.71 0.00* 
Justification 1 1.45 0.23  
Cognitive Load 1 11.51 0.00* 
Rating Type 1 1.99 0.16  
Justification * Cognitive Load 1 0.56 0.45  
Justification * Rating Type 1 0.74 0.39  
Rating Type * Cognitive Load 1 14.96 0.00* 
Error 306 (0.46)   
    
Note. Value enclosed in parenthesis represents mean square error. 
* p < .05 
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Table 11      
Mean Performance Accuracy Ratings as a Function of Cognitive Load 
and Rating Type 
Cognitive Load Rating Type N  Mean SD   
Low Specific 78 1.40 0.71  
  Overall 74 1.05 0.64  
 Specific and Overall 152 1.23 0.69  
High Specific 83 0.88 0.55  
 Overall 81 1.06 0.83   
 Specific and Overall 164 0.97 0.70  
High and Low Specific 161 1.13 0.68  
  Overall 155 1.06 0.74   
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Table 12    
Analysis of Variance for Recognition accuracy 
    
Source df F p 
Experience as a server 1 0.41 0.52 
Server Sex 1 7.70 0.01* 
Participant Sex 1 4.84 0.03* 
Justification 1 0.04 0.85 
Cognitive Load 1 96.57 0.00* 
Rating Type 1 1.16 0.28 
Justification * Cognitive Load 1 0.04 0.84 
Justification * Rating Type 1 0.03 0.87 
Rating Type * Cognitive Load 1 0.07 0.80 
Error 306 (0.02)   
    
Note. Value enclosed in parenthesis represents mean square error. 
* p < .05 
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Table 13        
Mean Ratings as a Function of Sex 
     
   
Rating Accuracy 
 
Recognition 
accuracy 
Participant 
sex Server Sex 
N  Mean SD   Mean SD 
Male Male 54 1.30 0.77   0.71 0.15 
  Female 59 1.15 0.75  0.71 0.17 
 
Both 
servers 113 1.22 0.76  0.71 0.16 
            
Female Male 100 0.98 0.60  0.71 0.16 
 Female 103 1.07 0.73  0.79 0.13 
 
Both 
servers 203 1.02 0.67  0.75 0.15 
            
Male and 
Female 
Male 
Server 154 1.09 0.68  0.71 0.15 
 
Female 
Server 162 1.10 0.74  0.76 0.15 
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Table 14         
Mean Confidence Ratings 
            
  
Low Load 
 
High Load 
Rating Judgment N Mean SD   N Mean SD 
Cooperation Implicit 39 6.05 0.97  42 6.31 0.75 
  Explicit 39 5.77 1.04  41 6.15 0.73 
Memory Implicit 39 6.08 0.90  42 5.88 1.21 
  Explicit 39 5.90 0.99  41 5.85 1.17 
Overall Implicit 33 5.64 1.17  44 5.91 1.07 
  Explicit 41 5.85 0.79   37 5.54 1.04 
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Table 15    
Analysis of Variance for Confidence in Performance Ratings 
Source df F p 
Experience as a server 1 0.24 0.62 
Server Sex 1 0.80 0.37 
Participant Sex 1 0.00 0.99 
Justification 1 1.14 0.29 
Cognitive Load 1 0.27 0.60 
Rating Type 1 5.63 0.02* 
Justification * Cognitive Load 1 0.82 0.37 
Justification * Rating Type 1 0.12 0.73 
Rating Type * Cognitive Load 1 1.78 0.18 
Error 306 (0.83)   
    
Note. Value enclosed in parenthesis represents mean square error. 
* p < .05 
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Appendix A 
Sample Performance Appraisal Video Script 
LOW PERFORMANCE 
 
Memory- Brings orders to wrong people. 
 
Setting: Two people- one male, one female- waiting to receive main course. 
Conversing about friend in MBA program. 
 
G1 (Female): I've heard they serve delicious veal marsala here. I'm really glad I 
ordered it. 
 
G2(Male): Yeah, I've heard the Steak Diane is quite good. A buddy of mine was here 
last week, and he said it was fantastic! 
 
G1(Fe): Well, I'm starving! I can't wait to get our order. 
 
Waitress approaches table carrying a tray. 
 
G2(Ma): I am hungry too. Ah, here's our waiter... 
 
Waitress places a meal in front of the two individuals. 
 
G1(Fe): Ah super! Miss, I'm sorry, but this isn't what I ordered. I ordered Veal 
Marsala. 
 
G2(Ma):(Addressing waitress) This doesn’t look like Steak Diane it looks like 
London Broil, or something.  
 
Waitress: (repeats the correct order, apologizes, and leaves to get the Steak Diane and 
Veal Marsala) And you had Steak Diane, and you had Veal Marsala, I must have 
brought the wrong order. I’m really sorry I will get your correct orders. 
 
Conversation about "Alan" resumes between the man and woman seated at the table. 
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Appendix B 
Performance dimensions. 
 
Dinner bill: 
How well did the server present the bill to the appropriate guest at the appropriate 
time, and ensure that the bill had been added correctly and can be read and 
understood by the guests? 
 
Maintaining performance levels: 
How well did the server maintain patience, composure and good service when under 
pressure from crowds, large parties, or when tired? 
 
Memory: 
How well did the server remember orders, bring the correct order to the guest, and 
remember the correct beverages and side orders?   
 
Cooperation: 
How well did the server accept guidance from supervisors and coworkers, and 
cooperate with and help other servers, supervisors, and wait staff?   
 
Work Habits: 
How consistently did the server wear appropriate clothing and arrive at work on time?  
Was the server well groomed, prepared for work, and flexible to accommodate 
company needs? 
 
Menu familiarity: 
How well did the server display a familiarity with the food prices, ingredients, 
quality, portion sizes, and daily specials? 
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Appendix C 
Opening Instructions 
Thank you for coming in today.  In this study you are going to be watching some 
videos of waiters and waitresses.  You are then going to rate their performance.  
Please carefully read all of the instructions as you go through the study.  This is a nice 
short study so you can take your time.  Please let me know if you have any questions 
at any point. You can now read the instructions on the computer and begin. 
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Appendix D 
Explicit manipulation screenshot 
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Appendix E 
Sample memory recognition question screenshot 
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Appendix F 
 
Final rating choice 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
